17. Ukraine is in crisis: an increase in stagnant diseases

1970–1980 entered the history of the USSR as years of “stagnation” in politics, economics, culture, and national relations.

In the socio-political life of the country: 1) conservative tendencies reigned supreme. Received official approval concept of developed socialism, according to which the slow, systematic, gradual improvement of real socialism, built “completely and completely” in the USSR, will take an entire historical era. In 1977, it was legislatively enshrined in the introduction to the new Constitution of the USSR. The thesis about the leading and guiding role of the CPSU was also enshrined in the Constitution; 2) in practice, not all democratic freedoms proclaimed by the Constitution were fulfilled. In particular, the Councils of People's Deputies at all levels remained only a decoration, and real power belonged to the party apparatus, which developed and made all the main decisions. His control over society remained comprehensive; 3) the apparatus and the nomenklatura that made it up, party and state officials of a certain level, to use the term of those years, were “degenerated.” L.I. Brezhnev, who for 18 years held the post of First (from 1966 - General) Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, considered it necessary to maintain personnel stability in the apparatus, strengthen its privileges, and refrain from harsh actions against the nomenklatura. Most ministers and regional committee secretaries at that time held their positions for 15–20 years. Most members of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee were in power for more than 15 years; 4) there is a merging of the party-state apparatus with the “shadow economy”, corruption, since the omnipotence of the party elite was not supported by property and it gradually began to strive to secure for itself the share of public property that it controlled.

“Stagnation” phenomena in the economy: 1) in the 1970-80s. there was extensive economic development; 2) new enterprises were built (but only a few technically and technologically corresponded to the world level (VAZ, KamAZ); 3) the production of irreplaceable natural resources (oil, gas, ore) increased; 4) the number of people employed in manual and unskilled labor increased; 5) achievements of scientific and technological progress were implemented extremely poorly; 6) the command economy could not work effectively in the conditions scientific and technological revolution, but the country’s leadership still tried to solve all the problems mainly by administrative means; 7) agriculture received huge capital investments, but did not show a noticeable increase in production.

A heavy burden for the country's economy was the huge costs of the military-industrial complex, which made it possible to maintain military-strategic parity with the United States.

The maturation of crisis phenomena in the socio-economic and political spheres: 1) every year the possibilities of the cost-effective economic growth model were reduced, the extraction of fuel and raw materials was reduced, moving to hard-to-reach areas of Siberia and the Far North, it became more expensive; the equipment was worn out and obsolete; 2) serious deformations occurred in the social sphere. People's incomes were constantly growing, but neither industry nor agriculture could offer the population a sufficient amount of goods, food, and services. A shortage developed, queues and cronyism became commonplace; 3) the so-called “shadow economy” arises (underground workshops, “speculation”, etc.); 4) after the death of Brezhnev, Yu.V. became the new General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee. Andropov (1982–1984). He began investigating criminal cases in which mainly high-ranking leaders and officials were accused, which revealed the scale and danger of the crisis that had arisen.

After Khrushchev’s resignation, L.I. became the new leader of the country. Brezhnev, who previously held the position of Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, and then Second Secretary of the Central Committee.

The term " stagnation", i.e. it was a time of slow development in all spheres of life of Soviet society.

"Stagnation" in the economic sphere

In the economic sphere, “stagnation” is manifested in a rapid drop in production growth rates. Labor productivity is steadily declining. The economic lag of the USSR from developed Western countries, especially in high-tech industries, is becoming increasingly obvious. The list of scarce goods was constantly growing.

To overcome these problems, the Soviet leadership 1965 carries out economic reforms, initiated by the Chairman of the Council of Ministers A.N. Kosygin.

The reform began with the abolition of economic councils and the restoration of industrial ministries. In general, it did not encroach on the directive economy, but provided for a mechanism of internal self-regulation, material interest of producers in the results and quality of labor. The number of mandatory indicators imposed from above was reduced, a share of profits remained at the disposal of enterprises, and self-financing was proclaimed.

Debts were written off from collective and state farms, purchasing prices were increased, and a premium was established for excess sales of products to the state. The implementation of programs for comprehensive mechanization of agricultural production, chemicalization of soils and land reclamation began. A course was set for the creation of agro-industrial complexes.

The success of the reforms was short-lived.

Reasons for the overall failure of reforms:

1. The reluctance of the party leadership to put up with the growing independence of enterprise directors.
2. Continued decline in labor productivity.
3. The need to continue the arms race and, therefore, the need for the priority development of heavy industry.

The authorities saw the main way to prevent economic collapse in speeding up supplies to the Western energy market. The leadership of the USSR proclaims a course towards the strictest economy - the slogan of L.I. Brezhnev “The economy must be economical!”

As the state economy slid into stagnation, the so-called shadow economy developed more and more - from various underground workshops to outright crime.

The crisis in the economy was aggravated by the social policy pursued in the country, aimed at maintaining at least a relatively high standard of living of the population. In the context of a constant decline in labor productivity, solving this problem required the state to invest huge amounts of money in the social sphere. By the beginning of the 1980s. It became increasingly difficult to maintain a high standard of living for the population. The shortage of consumer goods is becoming total. A card system is being introduced for the main types of food and even industrial goods.

"Stagnation" in the political sphere

IN political sphere the time of "stagnation" became " golden age"for the party-state nomenklatura (privileged layer of officials), which under Khrushchev turned into an independent subject of politics. Occupation of government positions becomes lifelong. A system of mutual responsibility for officials emerges. Corruption has flourished. “Stagnation” in the political sphere is characterized by another term – “ neo-Stalinism" This phenomenon is usually understood as the cessation of criticism of Stalin’s “cult of personality” and the beginning of the formation of the “cult of personality” of Brezhnev himself.

The ideological crisis during the years of “stagnation” continued to grow. To delay the final collapse of the communist idea, a concept was created about the presence in the country of " developed socialist society", as an intermediate stage in the construction of communism. This idea was consolidated in the new constitution of the country.

October 7 1977 the fourth Constitution of the USSR in 60 years was adopted (“ Constitution of developed socialism"). Article 6 officially consolidated the leading position of the CPSU in the life of society. For the first time, the most important international obligations of the USSR were included in the Constitution of the country - the main provisions of the Helsinki Act on Human Rights. However, many provisions written in the Constitution ultimately remained only on paper.

The main result of the political development of the USSR in these years was the conservation of the political regime and the strengthening of the dominance of the party apparatus, the leadership of the army and the KGB in the life of society.

Despite the growing persecution, even at the turn of the 50-60s. a movement of dissidents (dissidents, human rights activists) is born. Uncensored publications of “samizdat” appeared - “Syntax”, “Phoenix”, etc., circles and youth organizations. Within the framework of the dissident movement, the struggle for human rights in the USSR begins.

The reasons for the emergence of the dissident movement in the USSR:

1. General crisis of communist ideology. The Soviet people are beginning to lose faith in the possibility of building communism.
2. The suppression of democratic movements in Eastern European countries by the Soviet army. Human rights activists were especially impressed by the events in Hungary and Czechoslovakia (1968).
3. Later, the growth of the human rights movement was facilitated by the signing of the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (Helsinki, 1975). Under this international agreement, the USSR pledged to respect human rights on its own territory, but grossly violated it. A human rights “Helsinki Group” is being created.

Academician A.D. becomes one of the leaders of the human rights movement. Sakharov.

After the death of L.I. Brezhnev ( 1982 d.) Becomes the General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee Yu.V. Andropov(former chairman of the KGB). He put forward the idea of ​​“improving socialism.” However, this “improvement” was supposed to be carried out using purely directive and even repressive methods, without a serious restructuring of the system itself as a whole.

In February 1984 Yu.V. Andropov died. His place was taken K.U. Chernenko– an elderly and unhealthy person, incapable of carrying out serious changes.

"Stagnation" in the spiritual sphere

The development of spiritual culture during the years of “stagnation” was extremely contradictory.

Since the mid-70s. The practice of government contracts for the production of films, writing scripts, novels and plays began to be actively introduced. Not only their number and topics were determined in advance by the party authorities. This approach very soon led to stagnation in artistic culture. Ideological control over the media and cultural institutions has increased significantly. In September 1974, an exhibition of contemporary art held right on the street in Moscow was destroyed. Artists were beaten and paintings were crushed by bulldozers (" bulldozer exhibition"). The “Bulldozer Exhibition” is considered to be the moment of the end of the “thaw” in the spiritual sphere. Theatrical productions (even of the classical repertoire) were produced only with the approval of special commissions.

The Iron Curtain has fallen again, depriving Soviet people opportunities to read books and watch films by a number of foreign authors.

Cultural figures whose opinions ran counter to the party's guidelines found themselves outside the USSR or were deprived of the opportunity to work with full dedication. Writers V. Aksenov, A. Solzhenitsyn, V. Maksimov, V. Nekrasov, V. Voinovich, poet I. Brodsky, film director A. Tarkovsky, theater director Yu. Lyubimov, cellist M. Rostropovich, opera singer G. . Vishnevskaya, poet and performer A. Galich.

The ideology of “stagnation” was objectively opposed by representatives of “village” prose (F. Abramov, V. Astafiev, Sh. Belov, V. Rasputin, B. Mozhaev, V. Shukshin), who figuratively showed the consequences of complete collectivization for the fate of the Russian village. B, Vasiliev, Yu. Trifonov wrote about the problems of morality in Stalin and subsequent years. Popular directors of those years G. Tovstonogov, A. Efros, M. Zakharov, O. Efremov, G. Volchek, T. Abuladze, A. German, A. Askoldov and many others offered their views on the meaning of life and the role of the intellectual in it. theater and film directors.

A specific feature of the culture of the 60-70s. there was a so-called tape revolution" The recognized leaders here were V. Vysotsky, A. Galich, Y. Kim, B. Okudzhava, M. Zhvanetsky.

All this testified to the presence and confrontation of two directions in Russian culture - the official-protective one, which carried out the social order of the authorities, and the democratic one, which prepared the preconditions for the spiritual renewal of society.

Foreign policy of the USSR in 1965-1984

Soviet foreign policy of the 60-80s. is inextricably linked with the name of the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR A.A. Gromyko (“Gromyko era”).

One of the primary foreign policy objectives of this period was the normalization of relations between East and West. In the summer of 1966, French President Charles de Gaulle paid a visit to Moscow for the first time in the entire post-war period. The most important event of the 70s. was the resumption of Soviet-American meetings at top level.

Beginning with R. Nixon's visit to Moscow in May 1972 and until 1975, the world lived in an atmosphere détente. The policy of détente consisted of economic agreements and nuclear arms limitation treaties. May 26 1972 A temporary agreement was signed in Moscow, called OSV-1, which limited the number of offensive weapons for both sides. IN 1978 was concluded OSV-2, agreements were also signed on the limitation of underground nuclear tests, on missile defense (the Treaty on PRO – 1972 G.).

IN 1975 took place in Helsinki Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) leaders of thirty-three European countries, the USA and Canada. The documents signed there affirmed the basic principles on which international relations should henceforth be built.

Détente ended after the entry of Soviet troops into Afghanistan ( 1979 G.). As a sign of protest against the USSR's intervention in Afghanistan, the United States and several dozen other Western countries boycotted the XXII Olympic Games in Moscow (1980). In response, the USSR and its allies boycotted the Olympic Games in Los Angeles (1984).

IN 1983 Another blow was dealt to the negotiation process - a Soviet fighter shot down a South Korean Boeing 747 airliner, which for unknown reasons violated the border of USSR airspace. After this, US President Reagan called the Soviet Union an “evil empire.”

The USSR is actively involved in events in the Middle East, providing open support to the Arab side. In 1967, the Soviet Union broke off diplomatic relations with Israel, which launched the “six-day war.”

Relations between the USSR and the countries of the socialist camp were not easy, especially with China, the confrontation with which led to an armed conflict on the island Damansky(March 1969 city, Ussuri River).

In relations with the European countries of the socialist camp, the main task of the USSR was to eliminate the threat of the disintegration of the camp and to unite it more closely in political, military and economic relations. The USSR was guided in this direction of its foreign policy by “ Brezhnev Doctrine"- the doctrine of limited sovereignty for socialist states that are actually dependent on the Soviet Union.

in spring 1968 In Czechoslovakia, a powerful opposition movement arises demanding the reform of socialism - “ Prague Spring" The opposition was supported by part of the party leadership (A. Dubcek). On the night of August 20-21, 1968, troops from five countries participating in the Warsaw Warsaw War entered Czechoslovakia. The Prague Spring is over.

The next conflict was associated with a sharp increase in prices in Poland in 1980. It caused a wave of strikes, which reached its climax in the summer of 1980 in Gdansk. The struggle was led by the independent trade union "Solidarity" led by L. Walesa. On December 13, 1981, General W. Jaruzelski introduced martial law in the country. Despite the “normalization” of the situation in Poland, the crisis of the socialist camp is becoming obvious.

The era of stagnation (period of stagnation) is a time in the development of the Soviet Union, characterized by relative stability in all spheres of life of the state, a fairly high standard of living for citizens and the absence of serious shocks.

The period of stagnation, like any time period in the history of Russia, does not have clear boundaries, but most often historians mean the period of 20 years between L.I.’s coming to power. Brezhnev (mid-1960s) and the beginning (early 1980s). It is conventionally indicated that the period of stagnation lasted from 1964 to 1986.

The concept of the era of stagnation

The concept of “stagnation” was first used in the report of M.S. Gorbachev at the 27th Congress of the CPSU Central Committee, when he noted that stagnation was beginning to appear in the development of the Soviet Union and the lives of citizens. Since then, the term “period of stagnation” has firmly entered history as a designation for this time.

Despite the seemingly negative connotation of the term “stagnation,” it has a dual meaning. On the one hand, it marks one of the brightest periods in the development of the Soviet Union. It was during these 20 years, according to historians, that the USSR reached its greatest prosperity: new cities were built, the country achieved success in the conquest of space, in sports, cultural life and other areas, and the material well-being of citizens increased. The absence of serious political and economic upheavals during this period strengthened the stability prevailing in the country and the confidence of citizens in the future.

However, it should be noted that many scholars attribute the stability in the economy of that period to a sharp rise in oil prices, which allowed state leaders to further delay reforms without losing profits. Economic growth slowed significantly during the era of stagnation, but the sale of oil smoothed out these phenomena, so the state did not experience significant difficulties.

Thus, it turns out that the era of stagnation, on the one hand, was the most favorable period in the life of the USSR, marked by the conquest of space and high social security, but, on the other hand, this period was only the “calm before the storm”, since high prices for oil could not be preserved forever, which means that the economy, which had stalled in its development, was in for serious shocks.

Characteristics of the era of stagnation

Conservation of the political regime. During almost 20 years of Brezhnev's rule, the administrative and managerial apparatus has changed little. Tired of constant reshuffles and reorganizations, party members happily accepted Brezhnev’s slogan “Ensure stability,” which not only led to the absence of serious changes in the structure of the ruling apparatus, but actually froze it.

During the entire period, no changes were made in the party, and all positions became lifelong. As a result, the average age of members of the public administration structure was 60-70 years. This situation also led to increased party control - the party now controlled the activities of many, even extremely small, government agencies.

The growing role of the military sphere. The country was in a state with the United States, so one of the main tasks was to increase its military power. During this period, weapons began to be produced in large quantities, including nuclear and missile weapons, and new combat systems were actively developed.

Industry, as in the period, largely worked for the military sphere. The role of the KGB increased again not only in domestic but also in foreign policy.

Decline of the agricultural industry and cessation of economic development. Although on the whole the country was successfully moving forward, prosperity was growing, the economy plunged into stagnation and sharply reduced the pace of its development. The USSR received its main funds from the sale of oil, most of the enterprises gradually moved to large cities, and agriculture was slowly rotting.

After the agrarian reform, many peasants actually lost their jobs, as the famous “potato trips” were introduced among students. Collective and state farms were increasingly making losses, as the work was done by students rather than professionals. Crop losses have increased in some areas by up to 30%.

A similar situation in the countryside led to the fact that citizens began to move en masse to cities, crop yields fell, and by the end of the period of stagnation, a food crisis began to brew. It was especially difficult during this period for Ukraine, Kazakhstan and other regions whose main activities were agriculture and the mining industry.

Social life. Although the further development of the economy inspired fears, the everyday life of citizens improved significantly and their well-being increased. Many citizens of the USSR had the opportunity to improve their living conditions in one way or another, many became owners of good cars and other quality things.

However, along with the growth of the affluent population, there was an increase in the number of poor people, but this has not yet reached catastrophic proportions, since food was relatively cheap. On average, the average Soviet citizen began to live much better compared to previous periods.

Results and significance of the era of stagnation

As mentioned above, the era of stagnation became only the “calm before the storm.” Although during these 20 years the country finally experienced stability and in some areas (space) rose to the top of the world rankings, the apparent stability in everything forced the leadership of the USSR to once again postpone economic reforms. The economy, which relies on the sale of oil, did not develop even by the end of the 70s. turned into a lagging behind, which resulted in extremely negative consequences when the price of oil dropped significantly. The largely favorable years for citizens during the Brezhnev era brought with them serious upheavals during perestroika.

The Future grows from the Past through the Present .

The concept of public safety provides a methodology that allows us to distinguish between processes occurring in the universe. The essence of this methodology, set out in the Sufficiently General Theory of Management (DOCT), is the assertion that all processes are controllable, management always has a specific goal, and that the highest management is carried out by God. From these positions one can see the direction of all processes.

However, in order to see in addition to methodology, you need to know about what happened and have knowledge of facts. Often, facts even from the immediate past are reported by certain authorities in passing, keeping something silent, and focusing on something, on the contrary, depending on undisclosed goals. Let's not talk about historical myths and myth-makers, storytellers and distorters who, when ordered, very carefully change accents when assessing historical events. These distortions are studied by historians such as E.Yu. Spitsyn and A.V. Pyzhikov.

In a series of publications, we offer to get acquainted with the history of the country using lecture notes on Russian history by A.I. Fursov. Lectures provide the necessary minimum of information, which, if necessary, can be expanded, supplemented and detailed independently. We proceed in reverse chronological order in considering the periods because we are confronted with the assertions of some authorities that " the people did not defend the country in 1991, that the people betrayed", etc., which provided an incentive to understand this issue.

It turned out that everything is not quite as these authorities claim. In addition to cultivating feelings of guilt and their own inferiority (the people are traitors), they use old recipe“uniting the people” against a common enemy (now against the USA) for, naturally, liberation from the adversary, leaving in silence the most important question: By what concept (plan) will we live when we are free?

As the lecture notes show, in the current situation (lack of sovereignty for all priorities, except, perhaps, the 6th (conventional weapons of physical destruction) generalized means of control, It’s not so much the external enemy’s fault, and the lack of methodological culture among the country's top leadership, illiteracy of members of the CPSU Central Committee, lack of an adequate theory of socialist economics, systemic irresponsibility of the top leadership, a change from vertical mobility (when a person from the very bottom rises to the top of power) to horizontal (when leaders are recruited from a narrow clan community who do not go through all the stages, but are immediately placed in high positions after training), and in the field of ideology - a rejection of the ideals of justice. They began to rebel. On the other hand, there is a strict ban on criticism and dogmatization of Marxism for everyone else, which subsequently led to the “indifference” of the masses against the backdrop of the growing hypocrisy of the nomenklatura, which was broadcasting about the construction of communism, but in reality has long turned into a new “class” of exploiters. There was even a joke about this. At an appointment at the clinic. Doctor, I have an ear-eye disease. Probably ear, nose and throat? There is no ear-eye: I hear one thing, but see another!

Previously, we published lecture notes by A.I. Fursov "" and his conversations with N.I. Krotov "". Now we continue to publish lecture notes on Russian history. Period from 1964 to 1985 takes up a large volume (more than 50 pages), and therefore we publish the material, breaking it down by topic:

1. General characteristics of the era. Periodization. Power;

2. Economic development of the country;

3. Defense industry;

4. Social sphere. National problems;

5. National problems;

6. Struggle in the ideological and political sphere;

7. Foreign policy;

8. Education, science and technology.

A lot of problems that emerged during perestroika and even in the post-perestroika period are those problems, those knots that were tied exactly then, in the 1960s. The Brezhnev period is the “golden age of the nomenklatura”, based on eating up the future (in the early 1970s, the nomenklatura and accompanying strata made up about 0.5 million families, 1% of the population), a missed chance for the Soviet system to make a progressive historical breakthrough.

A lot of problems that emerged during perestroika and even in the post-perestroika period are those problems, those knots that were tied exactly then, in the 1960s.

I. General assessment of the era.

The Brezhnev period is the “golden age of nomenklatura”, based on eating the future(in the early 1970s, the nomenclature and accompanying layers were about 0.5 million families, 1% of the population).

1. The fundamental difference between the Brezhnev regime and the Khrushchev regime.

2. The dominance of horizontal mobility of senior personnel over vertical (rotation);

The transition of the elite to the mode of social self-reproduction.

3. Transformation of the Soviet elite into a closed group, devoid of strategic vision and increasingly satisfying its material needs in the West.

4. The growing desire of a certain part of the nomenklatura for integration with the West (“convergence of socialism and capitalism”).

Convergence- this is the rapprochement of capitalism and socialism and the transformation into something in between - there was such a theory in the West, it was thrown into the Soviet nomenklatura and part of the nomenklatura bought it. The term comes from the field of ophthalmology, this is when something heavy hits the forehead and the eyes converge (like in Disney cartoons of a cat) - this is called “convergence”, convergence.

5. A gradual shift of real power to the middle level - regional committees and departments.

The gradual loss of the USSR as a single national economic complex;

Further loss of the planned nature of the economy.

6. The process of fusion in a number of republics and regions (especially in Transcaucasia and Central Asia) the party apparatus with economic bodies, and these latter with the “shadow economy”; formation of parties. household shadow clans.

7. Social and moral decay of a significant part of the “tops”, the increase in their inadequacy to the modern world.

“Trophy” moods and “indifference” of the lower classes towards the end of Brezhnev’s rule.

8. Acute controversy in the mid-1980s between high level of scientific, technical, military-industrial and general economic development of the USSR, on the one hand, and low managerial, intellectual-volitional and strategic level of the Soviet elite, on the other hand, is the main (necessary) reason for the future destruction of the USSR.

II. Periodization

1. 1964-1967/68
2. 1968-1974/75
3. 1975-1982
4. 1982-1985

III. Power

1. Khrushchev's removal from power. Abolition of Khrushchev's reforms of 1962 and 1957/58. in 1964 and 1965

2. Biography of L. I. Brezhnev.

3. The balance of power in the Soviet leadership in 1964-1967/68: confrontation of approaches or confrontation of generations?

4. 1965-1967 - a missed chance for the Soviet system to make a progressive historical breakthrough.

June plenum of the CPSU Central Committee in 1967 - a fork in the post-war history of the USSR.

a) Economic “reform” of 1965 - a further departure from the socialist principles of economic development, an unsuccessful transition to the adoption of Western models in the economy (actually there was little of the reform there, but it is customary to call it “reform” - that’s why it’s in quotes).

B) refusal:
- progressive system OGAS - National automated system - (developed under the leadership of academician V. M. Glushkov) - scientific and technical management of society and the economy based on dynamic self-improving planning, providing the USSR with a historical breakthrough and the transformation of systemic anti-capitalism into real post-capitalism.

Threat to nomenklatura from OGAS :

* transparency of power;

* opening of the shadow administrative market and falsification of plans, their implementation;

The threat to the West is the possibility of the USSR winning a peaceful competition;

Developments in cold nuclear fusion by Ivan Stepanovich Filimonenko. If his work had not been destroyed, then, in fact, a new energy industry would have arisen, which would not have needed either oil or everything else. That is, rejection of the energy revolution that could bury the West;

Integrated defensive-offensive oceanic-land-space complex (developed by V.N. Chelomey - designer, the book about it by Bodrikhin ZZhL was published in the 2nd edition);

If we managed to implement it, we would move away from the West by 50 years or even more; there would be no need for an arms race.

The Soviet system is systemic anti-capitalism and its vulnerable spot is that production base was the same as capitalism, industrial. In order for anti-to move into post-capitalism, three problems had to be solved:

1) it was necessary to create a fundamentally new management of society, which would increase production,

2) new energy was needed and

3) a breakthrough in defense was needed.

The USSR could do all this from 1965 to 1975 because the programs in question were developed for implementation in 1973-1975, but the interest of the nomenklatura, on the one hand, and the West, on the other, led to the fact that it was all buried. They destroyed documentation and banned something. As a result, the USSR did not make a breakthrough and it all ended with Gorbachevism.

c) June (1967) plenum of the CPSU Central Committee - speech by the first secretary of the Moscow City Committee N. Egorychev, followed by his removal from office;

The beginning of the defeat of the group of “Komsomol members” - representatives of the young educated generation, focused on the “national-Bolshevik” course of the post-war years;

The formation of the “Suslov-Andropov-Ustinov” combination at the plenum with Gromyko joining them is a time bomb under the Soviet power system.

Creation of closed analytical units at IMEMO (Institute of World Economy and International Relations), which worked for Yu. V. Andropov and at the Institute for African Studies (A.N. Kosygin).

Purge of "Komsomol members" in 1967-1970.

“The Case of Suslov” (1969-1970). XXIV Congress of the CPSU (1971).

Statement (in the Constitution) of the construction of “developed socialism” and a “state of the whole people” in the USSR ( audit Marxist ideas of the “dictatorship of the proletariat” and the “withering away of the state” under communism). We are talking about what was enshrined in the Constitution. The jokers said “developed”, which means it could also be “curled”. They developed it, but now they will curl it.

The fact is that in Marxist theory, the state under socialism is a state of the dictatorship of the proletariat. This has been removed. Replaced " state of the whole people». The logic is like this: we do not have antagonistic classes of the proletariat and the bourgeoisie, which means we do not need the dictatorship of the proletariat. There will be a dictatorship of the CPSU. And the second thing is that Marx-Engels had the thesis about the withering away of the state under socialism and during the transition to communism. This thesis was also not reflected in the new constitution.

Article 6 - on the leadership and guiding role of the CPSU.

Article 6 was introduced into the Constitution

Consolidating the principle of socialist internationalism in the relations of the USSR with socialist and liberated countries.

Fixation of foreign policy as a course aimed at creating favorable international conditions “for building communism in the USSR.”

Transfer of power from the Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee to sectoral and functional departments of the Central Committee. Important point. Now it was not the plenum that decided where people gathered, but a purely bureaucratic decision in the relevant departments.

The special role of the General Department and the Department of Organizational and Party Work.
These two departments played a decisive role plus, naturally, the international department of the CPSU Central Committee.

Reproduction of the country's top elite(4-5 thousand people, of which 1 thousand are in Moscow) not by promotion along the party ladder (vertical mobility), and through personnel training in elite educational institutions (Academy of Social Sciences under the CPSU Central Committee, Higher Party School, Higher Komsomol School, Diplomatic Academy, graduate School trade union movement, Institute of International Relations of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs).

The difference between the Diplomatic Academy and MGIMO was as follows. Students studied at MGIMO, and at the diploma. The academy was not studied by students, for example, some promising second secretary of the Kemerovo regional committee of the CPSU, who has not three convolutions, but three and a half, and it is clear that he can learn languages. And so he was sent to the diplomatic academy, and he studied there for 2-2.5 years, and then went somewhere as an ambassador or first secretary of an embassy.

Personnel stagnation and aging in their positions are the norm of life for the late Soviet nomenklatura.

In Western Sovietology even such a term appeared - gerontocracy. Gerontology is the science of aging, gerontocracy is the rule of the old.

The balance of power in the Politburo and the Secretariat of the CPSU Central Committee after the XXV Congress of the CPSU.

Senior group (born 1899-1911):

Brezhnev L.I.,
Suslov Mikhail Andreevich,
Kosygin Alexey Nikolaevich,
Kirilenko Andrey Pavlovich,
Ustinov Dmitry Fedorovich,
Gromyko Andrey Andreevich,
Pelshe Arvid Yanovich,
Chernenko Konstantin Ustinovich,
Kuznetsov Vasily Vasilievich,
Ponomarev Boris Nikolaevich.

(Only old men go into battle)

Middle group (born 1912-1920):

Andropov Yuri Vladimirovich,
Grishin Viktor Vasilievich,
Kulakov Fedor Davydovich,
Masherov Pyotr Mironovich,
Mazurov Kirill Trofimovich,
Kunaev Dinmukhamed Akhmedovich,
Shcherbitsky Vladimir Vasilievich,
Rashidov Shafar Rashidovich,
Kapitonov Ivan Vasilievich,
etc.

Junior group (born 1921-1930) :

Romanov Grigory Vasilievich,
Aliyev (his son is now the President of Azerbaijan) Heydar Alirzaoglu
Dolgikh Vladimir Ivanovich,
Ryabov Yakov Petrovich.

"Four" main persons - Suslov, Andropov, Ustinov, Gromyko - who made decisions under the decrepit Brezhnev.

Promising Leaders: Romanov, Kulakov, Masherov.

Kulakov, Masherov will die a strange death unexpectedly in the prime of life 1 .

The general assessment of the era is that the Brezhnev period is the golden age of the nomenklatura: no one was in a hurry, no one was in a hurry, people lived for their own pleasure and the people remember the Brezhnev time as very good, calm. This is all true, but you just need to remember that during the Brezhnev era there was deliberately omitted a chance for a historical breakthrough and, secondly, we were eating away our future.

What is the fundamental difference between the Brezhnev regime and the Khrushchev regime?

Khrushchev made many mistakes. A number of his mistakes were irreversible for Soviet society as a systemic anti-capitalist. But the problem with the Brezhnev regime is even worse. He did not allow systemic anti-capitalism to turn into something else. The Brezhnev regime deliberately blocked, for class reasons, a breakthrough into the future. And this is a serious difference between these two modes. One exhausted the possibilities of systemic anti-capitalism, and the other did not allow systemic anti-capitalism to turn into something else.

There was a serious difference between Khrushchev and Brezhnev. Khrushchev was certainly an almost psychopathological personality, a voluntarist. Brezhnev was very calm, but Khrushchev was ideological person. Brezhnev was not an ideological person; he no longer believed in communism. He and his friends stood in positions and were very calm about everything that was happening. Khrushchev was a man who witnessed the revolution, and he felt his psychological connection with the revolution, and he was an ideological man. In addition, Khrushchev was a man of little culture, but Khrushchev thought on a global scale. Brezhnev was a man of regional communication level. What was important to him was a good attitude from the top, banquets, so that everything was calm, so that no one squabbled. He was not an evil person, he did not shout rot, I will destroy, I will show Kuzka’s mother, etc., but it was a peace of stagnation, a mire that became thicker and thicker and did not allow development. Khrushchev held high positions during the war. He was a lousy military leader, he and Timoshenko screwed up during the Kharkov battle, but nevertheless Khrushchev was in high military positions. Brezhnev started the war as a colonel and ended as a major general, i.e. I only went up one step.

Let's look at Brezhnev's biography. Brezhnev was born in 1906 in the Ekaterinoslav province (Ekaterinoslav is now called Dnepropetrovsk) into a simple working-class family. In 1927 he graduated from the Kursk Land Management and Reclamation College. In 1928 he married Victoria Denisova, with whom he lived all his life. In 1931 he joined the party, in 1935 he graduated from the Dneprodzerzhinsk Metallurgical Institute and already in 1936 he became the director of the metallurgical technical school at the age of 30. In 1937, his party career began. At this time, the Leninist guards are being cleansed and the youth begin to move up. In 1939 he became secretary of the Dnepropetrovsk Regional Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks), that is, after 2 years. During the war he was on political work. He graduated from the war with the rank of major general, head of the political department of the 4th Ukrainian Front. In the 1970s, such an episode as the defense of Malaya Zemlya was exaggerated. Brezhnev went to this Small Land two or three times, and a whole problem was made out of this, the Small Land is a great land and so on. There was even this joke:

Stalin and Zhukov are discussing some kind of military operation. Stalin looks at his watch and asks: “How much time do we have left?” Zhukov says that there are still 8 hours left and Stalin says: “Well, the most important thing is that we will have time to consult with Colonel Brezhnev!”

In the 70s there was a bacchanalia where they tried to show that Brezhnev was one of the heroes of the war. This was not true, but Brezhnev really liked it. He loved awards very much. And when, on his certain anniversary, it was decided to award him the medal of “Hero of Socialist Labor,” he wanted to be awarded for his services in the war. Brezhnev had a whole iconostasis of medals and orders.

After the war, Brezhnev became the 1st secretary of the Dnepropetrovsk regional committee and city committee. Then he becomes 1st Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Moldova. In 1952 he became secretary of the CPSU Central Committee. He was in that group of young people that Stalin was preparing to replace people like Molotov, Kaganovich, etc. After Stalin’s death, this entire team was pushed out, including Brezhnev. Brezhnev becomes deputy head of the Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy. He always follows the party line even in the army. In 1955, he was appointed 1st Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Kazakhstan, and in February 1956, at the 20th Congress of the CPSU, he became a candidate member of the Presidium and Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee. In 1960, he was appointed Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, that is, he became one of the main persons in the state. In 1963, he became secretary of the CPSU Central Committee and it was he who became one of the key figures in the conspiracy against Khrushchev. In 1964 he becomes 1st Secretary The Central Committee of the CPSU after Khrushchev was eliminated.

What else is characteristic of this period? What is the term in party slang for Brezhnev's rule? For example, Stalin's rule is a cult of personality, Khrushchev's is voluntarism. Brezhnev - stagnation. Some people think that stagnation is in the economy. No, there was no stagnation in the economy. Even with problems and by the end of Brezhnev’s rule, there were no systemic problems in the economy. They arose as a result of Gorbachev’s so-called reforms. By stagnation we mean something else. The fact is that this is the term that refers to dominance of horizontal mobility over vertical. The man, relatively speaking, failed to cope with the chemical industry as a deputy minister and is being moved to cinema. There was even such a nomenclature term “ throw on" A person will work there for some time, then he will be moved. And so they moved horizontally. Except if they didn’t make political mistakes or there was a completely terrible immorality with the mistress bathing in champagne, etc. This was already too much and then they threw it out or the closest connection with the shadow economy. But these were all excesses, but in principle, everything was very calm. Brezhnev was not a supporter of sudden movements or punishments. But he was a tough man when it came to matters of principle. for him things. It was under Brezhnev that the Soviet nomenclature turned into a closed group.

Soviet nomenklatura was a strange dominant group: it had no guarantee of physical existence (under Stalin, any nomenklatura could be put against the wall), they had no guarantee of economic existence (when they lost their position, they lost everything, they could not pass on their privileges to their children, that is, social guarantees). The history of the nomenklatura is a struggle to obtain a full range of guarantees: physical, so as not to be put against the wall, economic, social.

With Khrushchev, the nomenklatura achieved guarantees of its physical existence. On March 10, 1953, at the first plenum after Stalin’s death, it was decided that a member of the CPSU Central Committee could be arrested only with the permission of the CPSU Central Committee and the troika was liquidated.

If under Stalin the type of punishment was like this, for example, conditionally, there is a certain department, it did not cope with the task. People's Commissar - to the wall or for 10 years, and then - less and less punishment. Under Khrushchev the situation changed. The ministry was at fault. Nothing for the minister. The Deputy Minister is reprimanded and entered into his personal file. And an engineer of some plant, who made a mistake, goes to prison for 10 years. The pyramid has turned over. Firing egalitarianism ( French égalitarisme, from égalité - equality) disappeared. But Khrushchev was a categorical opponent of what are called social and economic guarantees. He believed that there should be a party maximum, that is, a party worker should not earn more than a certain level. In other words, by providing physical guarantees of the existence of the nomenclature Khrushchev stood in the way of the implementation of economic and social guarantees. And ultimately this was one of the reasons why he flew out of his chair. But under Brezhnev, the nomenklatura implemented economic and social guarantees. Not completely, of course, but nevertheless, stagnation, that is, horizontal mobility, is a kind of economic and social guarantee. There was only one thing missing: how to convey your privileges to children. To do this, it was necessary to turn into owners, which happened after 1991.

It was during the Brezhnev era that the nomenklatura began to take seriously what was written about it in the West. Khrushchev was “violet” that they were writing about him, that is, he was interested, but it did not affect him. Under Stalin the situation was different. For example, when Molotov was praised in one of the English newspapers and Molotov said at some meeting that, well, the English newspaper praised me... Stalin became very irritated and said that well, yes, when the enemy praises us, we should rejoice. Brezhnev was the first Soviet leader who was very attentive to what was written in the West. Naturally, he did not know any foreign languages, but they translated for him and his image was important to him, or, as they say now, “image” in the West. This indicates some psychological dependence. Of course, it was not the same as Gorbachev’s. It must be remembered that Brezhnev was a man who went through the war and he felt like a representative of the victorious people. In this regard, the difference between the Brezhnev generation and the Gorbachev generation is that the Gorbachevites are people who themselves did not go through the war. Brezhnev went through the war. He graduated as a general. And this plays a very, very important role. Towards the end of Brezhnev's rule, the process that is usually called moral decay began. Anti-Soviet, anti-communist ideas began to penetrate into the nomenklatura itself. And below, what is called “don’t care”, trophy sentiments, was spreading. People tried to drag something from work, showing fantastic ingenuity and were very indifferent to what was happening. From a sociological point of view, I highly recommend watching the old film from the 70s “Afonya”. This film shows well what was happening to public morality. There the main role is played by actor Kuravlev.

The balance of power in the Soviet leadership. When Khrushchev was removed from power, the majority believed that Brezhnev was a man for a year or two. He is gray, a “dark horse” and he is temporary. It was assumed that there would be a stronger leader. This once again suggests that the Soviet leadership did not know history well, because in the Soviet leadership all three first general secretaries (Lenin was not general secretary, he served as head of the Council of People's Commissars, in a new way, chairman of the Council of Ministers) Stalin was a dark horse , no one expected him to beat the giants. Then Khrushchev, from whom no one expected agility, and finally Brezhnev.

Confrontation of forces in the Soviet leadership: Were these two different approaches or two different generations?

It was both, but most importantly, it was the generational difference. The fact is that the Soviet leadership had a group of relatively young men who went through the war, but they managed to get an education. They were called "Komsomol members". Their leader was Aleksandr Nikolaevich Shelepin. This was the Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee for the Army and State Security. And these were his closest circle, for example, Vladimir Efimovich Semichastny, the chairman of the KGB, also a man with a Komsomol background. Without the Komsomol members, the Brezhnev-Suslov team would never have been able to organize a conspiracy against Khrushchev. True, the “Komsomol members” without them would not have been able to organize a conspiracy because the “Komsomol members” controlled the army and state security, but they were not members of the Politburo and therefore they could not organize affairs at the highest level. But it was assumed that they would be the leaders and, unfortunately, they themselves believed it.

As it turned out later, Khrushchev was going to leave about two years after he was removed. He was about to leave on his own. And he was going to nominate just those who are called “Komsomol members” instead of the Brezhnevs, Podgornys, and Kosygins. They either didn’t know it, but most likely they knew it, but they were impatient, they wanted power. And they believed that they would overthrow Khrushchev with the help of Brezhny, Kosygin and Co., and then they would remove these. These, Brezhnev, Suslov and Co., were experienced players and outplayed the Komsomol members. “Komsomol members” needed to support Khrushchev, surrender this entire team, and then two years later either Khrushchev himself left, or they removed him. And the history of the country would have gone completely differently. But the impatience of these people played a cruel joke on them and on the country.

Since 1967, Brezhnev’s team begins to purge the “Komsomol members”. The first person sent was Yegorychev, the first secretary of the Moscow City Committee of the CPSU. By 1970, almost all “Komsomol members” had been purged.

Note that in 1965-1970 the Soviet Union missed an important chance to break into the future. I missed it because it did not correspond to the interests of the nomenklatura. The most striking thing is that in In this case, the interests of the nomenklatura and the interests of the West coincided. And this breakthrough was blocked by them together.

It is very important that Plenum in June 1967 not only was Yegorychev removed, he was a very serious person, a participant in the conspiracy against Khrushchev, but also the group that later ruled the country was formed and the more decrepit Brezhnev became, the more interested he was in awards, the more this group actually ruled the country. This Suslov- the main ideologist of the country, Andropov, who in 1967 was appointed chairman of the KGB instead of Semichastny, a supporter of Shelepin, is Ustinov- Secretary of Military and Defense Industry, and Gromyko - Minister of Foreign Affairs. These four will play a serious role in our history. If we talk about congresses, XXIII, XXIV, XXV. If the XXIII, XXIV Congresses are some kind of struggle and strengthening of Brezhnev’s position, then the XXV Congress is already everything. The Brezhnevites won.

The people remember the XXV Congress as a curiosity. The fact is that in 1966 or 1967, a program called “Twenty-Five Again” was launched on the Mayak radio channel. She left at 6:05 to 6:30 and at 7:05 to 7:30 in the morning. It was a humorous program plus pop tunes, “twenty-five again!”, but when the 25th Congress of the CPSU approached, it became clear that this program was not appropriate, people began to joke: twenty-five again! This program was renamed, and then completely removed. So the XXV Congress will be remembered for this curious story .

After the 25th Congress, political groupings in the country coincided with age groups, which is very typical. This meant that age characteristics became the main ones. And three relatively young people fell out of this series: Romanov, Masherov and Kulakov. It is no coincidence that Romanov will then be compromised in every possible way. A rumor will be started about him that during the wedding of his daughter from the Hermitage, and he was the first secretary of the Leningrad city party committee, and a member of the Politburo, Catherine’s expensive service was taken from the Hermitage and many plates were broken. This is completely untrue, it was just a rumor started. Then it was officially refuted, but the fact is that a sediment remains. But Masherov and Kulakov died in very strange circumstances. In reality, they were Andropov's competitors on the path to power. Remember the four top officials under Brezhnev who influenced him: Suslov, Andropov, Ustinov and Gromyko.

What is very important is that first Suslov and then Andropov acted in conjunction with a man named Evgeniy Ivanovich Chazov. This was the head of the 4th Medical Directorate, which served the top of the country, and he was a very, very serious person. There is such a work by Alexander Ostrovsky “ Who installed Gorbachev" is a brilliant example of analytics. The fact is that Chazov wrote his memoirs “Health and Power” and then these memoirs, when he read them with a distant look, when the book came out, they scared him a little. There he wrote a few unnecessary things about himself. He published the 2nd edition, where he tried to remove these things, but it turned out even worse. And so Alexander Kostin, who wrote this book, built it on a comparison of two texts, the first edition of Chazov and the second. It can be read like a textbook.

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